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— ABSTRACT —
The paper is devoted to the role of the French 
Senate (under the constitution of the Fifth 
Republic) as an organ that can remain a  tool 
in the hands of opposition to the government� 
It has been pointed out that in the French 
formula of the semi-presidential system, which 
was created as a result of the rationalisation of 
a parliamentary model, bicameralism may be the 
field of special expansion of the executive which 
aims at the effective implementation of its own 
legislative activities� The author argues that this 
has a particularly negative impact on the status 
of the parliamentary opposition� This is the case 
even when the opposition has a majority in the 
Senate� The French second chamber, although the 
body is relatively strong, can be neutralised in 
legislative proceedings designed to implement the 
government’s programme� The author analyses 
the problem of marginalising the parliamentary 
opposition in relation to the two major political 
arrangements of the Fifth Republic: the so-called 
— ABSTRAKT —
Artykuł jest poświęcony roli francuskiego Senatu 
(pod rządami konstytucji V Republiki) jako 
organu, który może stanowić narzędzie w gestii 
opozycji antyrządowej� Wskazano, że we fran-
cuskiej formule systemu semiprezydenckiego, 
która została stworzona w efekcie racjonalizacji 
systemu parlamentarnego, bikameralizm może 
stanowić obszar szczególnej ekspansji egzeku-
tywy, która dąży do efektywnego wdrożenia 
swoich własnych zamierzeń legislacyjnych� 
Autor dowodzi, że ma to szczególnie negatywny 
wpływ na status opozycji parlamentarnej� Jest tak 
nawet wtedy, gdy opozycja dysponuje większością 
w Senacie� Francuska izba druga, choć jest to 
organ relatywnie silny, może być neutralizowana 
w procesie ustawodawczym zmierzającym do 
implementacji programu rządowego� Autor 
poddaje analizie problem marginalizacji opozycji 
parlamentarnej w odniesieniu do dwóch pod-
stawowych układów politycznych V Republiki: 
tak zwanego efektu większościowego (władza 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The political practice under the constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 has 
shown that the French political system can successfully operate in two basic 
variants: in the conditions of majority effect (fait majoritaire) and of cohabita-
tion� The first one assumes that both segments of the dual executive branch (the 
president of the Republic and the government led by the prime minister) come 
from the same political camp and enjoy support of at least the first chamber of 
parliament� In turn, cohabitation is based on the principle of political power-
sharing within the executive power in which the head of state and the head of 
government are political opponents� In such circumstances, the government 
always has a majority of seats in the first chamber – the National Assembly 
(Assemblée nationale), because the French semi-presidential system, as a result 
of the extreme rationalisation of a parliamentary model1, provides a political 
1  The process of rationalisation of a parliamentary system of government in the strict sense of 
the word was launched generally after the Second World War with the rise of a chancellor system in 
Germany and a semi-presidential system in France� Both models share a significant constitutional 
foundation� This common component is to strengthen the government – as one of the organs of dual 
executive power – over the legislature in order to prevent the latter from destabilising the institutional 
framework of the state� Thus the logic of the rationalisation process consists, first and foremost, in 
giving cabinets stable parliamentary majorities (Gicquel, 1992)� However, in the case of France, ra-
tionalisation has gone a step further, as the position of the head of state was also strengthened (for 
example, by introducing universal presidential elections in 1962, chairing the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers held in the presidential palace, as well as due to almost unrestricted possibility to dissolve 
the first chamber of parliament)� As a result, the French rationalisation followed two paths, moving, 
however, in the same direction – the reinforcement of the executive as such� Therefore, it can be said 
that in the case of contemporary France, the combination of various institutional factors (such as the 
powerful presidency elected by universal suffrage and the mechanisms of rationalised parliamenta-
rianism) causes the French presidents to become beneficiaries of solutions taken from two different 
institutional areas: presidentialism and parliamentarianism (Levy, Skach, 2008)�
majority effect (the executive branch is politically 
homogeneous) and cohabitation (the executive 
branch is politically divided)�
Keywords: French Fifth Republic, Senate, parlia-
mentary opposition, majority effect, cohabitation
wykonawcza jest politycznie jednorodna) oraz 
koabitacji (władza wykonawcza jest politycznie 
podzielona)�
Słowa kluczowe: V Republika Francuska, Senat, 
opozycja parlamentarna, efekt większościowy, 
koabitacja
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responsibility to at least one of the houses of parliament� It has to be the first 
chamber as a nationwide representation which is elected by universal suffrage� 
Taking into consideration contemporary constitutional systems, the issue of 
political responsibility before the second chamber remains open and depends 
on the position of the body within the constitutional structure� Symmetry of 
bicameralism in a parliamentary system requires that the second chamber be in 
this respect equal to the first chamber� An alternative solution, that is asymmetri-
cal bicameralism, allows for the functioning of the government in the conditions 
of different majorities in both segments of the legislature2� The latter possibility 
has been adopted under the French constitution of 1958 (Constitution du 4 
octobre…)� The Senate, which differs politically from the National Assembly, 
is not an obstacle to the efficient activity of the cabinet� This is particularly true 
in the case of political identity of the executive branch, that is during the afore-
mentioned majority effect� The second chamber is then the only body within the 
structure composed of the executive and legislative bodies, in which there may 
be a predominance of opposition parties�
Therefore, it can be stated that the formula of majority effect is not an 
internally homogeneous configuration� It may occur in a strong or weak form, 
depending on the political attitude of senators� The same applies to the phenom-
enon of cohabitation, which may also exist in two variants: with the Senate that 
supports the cabinet or with the Senate that is an ally of the president� As a result, 
the political structure of the French semi-presidential model is based on two 
basic configurations and their four further subtypes (Jakubiak, 2016)� All this 
creates a complex institutional environment for the functioning of the French 
party system, including major opposition groups� Political parties that are against 
the ruling camp may, in spite of their inferior political position, have control 
over some of the institutional components of the system of government� Under 
the variant of semi-presidentialism, in which there is a bicameral parliament 
2  The existence of symmetry or asymmetry of the houses of parliament largely depends on the 
manner in which they are formed� If second chambers are institutions based on appointments or 
co-options, the symmetrical relations between both segments of the legislative power do not have 
any justification today� However, the use of democratic electoral mechanisms in relation to the entire 
bicameral parliament causes the tendency to strengthen the contemporary second chambers (Lane, 
Ersson, 2000)� On the other hand, their strong legitimacy within the symmetrical structure can so-
metimes do not prevent from attempts to introduce asymmetry of bicameralism� It should be em-
phasized that such actions do not have to be successful, as evidenced by the example of Italy� The 
introduction of asymmetry of chambers in that country was rejected in a nationwide referendum of 
2016�
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combined with the dual executive power, such opposing institutions may be 
the president and the second chamber (however, the latter only provided that 
the government is not politically responsible before the body and does not have 
to be supported by a majority of its members)� The control of the opposition 
to the government over the presidency means the existence of cohabitation� In 
turn, such an influence exerted on the second chamber is more universal – it 
may occur not only during the periods of coexistence between presidents and 
prime ministers from different political camps, but also in the configuration 
of majority effect� Hence, it can be argued that it is the scope of the impact of 
the opposition through the Senate that constitutes a significant component in 
the structure of the French constitutional system, and at the same time affects 
actions taken by the executive in relation to the legislative� It is worth paying 
attention to the political importance of the second chamber under the 1958 basic 
law in conjunction with each of the main political configurations� It will enable 
to assess the extent to which the body can be used as a tool in the hands of the 
parliamentary opposition�
It can be argued that from the point of view of opposition parties, the Senate 
gains special importance during majority effect in a weak form, as well as during 
cohabitation combined with politically differentiated houses of parliament� In 
both cases, the majority in the second chamber is in opposition to the govern-
ment� In the second one, however, the Senate is linked to the head of state, because 
the executive branch remains politically divided� It needs to be emphasized that 
all these configurations have already occurred in political practice� The purpose 
of this article is to show that both of the political variants have – although due 
to the political composition of the executive they differ substantially from each 
other – a common denominator� It is a high level of activity of the government, 
which aims to neutralise – in terms of political influence – the second chamber 
dominated by the opposite political camp� The said activity is strongly associated 
with the use of procedures to rationalise a parliamentary system of government� 
They have been conceived as instruments to stabilise the executive (mainly the 
government, which is – in a parliamentary system – responsible to the legislature, 
and for this reason it needs to be specially protected)� It can be assumed that 
configurations in which opposition parties dominate the Senate using the body 
against the government involve two basic effects, namely the marginalisation 
of the second chamber in the legislative procedure as well as passivity of the 
executive in the use of legitimising impact of senators� As a result, the two above 
mentioned configurations lead ultimately to deepening the asymmetry of the 
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French bicameralism� Such a government strategy has a negative impact on the 
ability of opposition parties to exert a considerable influence on the process of 
exercising power� The neutralisation of the parliamentary opposition is another 
important aspect of rationalised parliamentarianism�
THE OPPOSITION-DOMINATED SENATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS  
OF MAJORITY EFFECT
In the first period of the Fifth Republic (until de Gaulle resigned from the 
office of the president after the 1969 referendum) there was no unequivocal 
support of senators for the policy of the ruling camp� The then Senate was 
basically conflicted with the Gaullists� The body seemed to be more centrist or 
even centre-left than centre-right� As a result, supporters of the head of state 
constituted a minority in the second chamber� Until 1962 they did not have, 
moreover, the absolute majority in the National Assembly (Chantebout, 2004; 
Avril, 1994)� Serious tension between the executive and senators was caused by 
some constitutional changes proposed by the head of state� In 1962, the proposal 
to introduce universal presidential elections was submitted� Opposition of 
senators, and in particular of Gaston Monnerville, the president of the chamber, 
was associated, inter alia, with application of article 11 of the constitution� It 
regulates a legislative referendum and is not intended to alter provisions of the 
basic law (Mastias, 1980; Jakubiak, 2012)� However, in this way it was possible 
to bypass the entire parliament, whose participation in the normal amendment 
procedure is required� A similar situation also occurred almost seven years later, 
when the Gaullists wanted to limit the constitutional position of the Senate� It 
was a confirmation of the maintenance of the above-mentioned conflict (Avril, 
1994)� The situation was normalised only after taking over the presidency by 
Georges Pompidou� The direct successor to de Gaulle and the prime ministers 
of this period (Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Pierre Messmer) did a few gestures 
to the Senate, which indicated that the earlier conflicts between the executive 
and the second chamber belonged to the past (Smith, 2009)� A remarkable factor 
that contributed to this was the progressive marginalisation of the formations 
representing the political centre� The process emerged at first in the National 
Assembly but it slowly began to be seen in the Senate� Good relations between 
the government and the second chamber persisted until gaining power by the 
left in the early 1980s�
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The taking of power by the left in 1981 occurred in both the presidential 
and parliamentary dimension� François Mitterrand’s victory in the presidential 
elections paved the way for the unprecedented success of the left in the parlia-
mentary ones, which took place due to the dissolution of the National Assembly 
by the head of state (Debbasch, Bourdon, Pontier, Ricci, 1985; Chapsal, 1984)� 
It is worth noting that the main reason of the dissolution was the president’s 
desire to secure a favourable majority in the first chamber (Jakubiak, 2013)3� The 
Senate remained outside of this kind of influence of the head of state, because 
the senators’ term cannot be shortened by dissolving parliament� As a result, 
the change of the existing political configuration did not include the second 
chamber, which was still centre-right� Thus, the presidential strategy could at 
best lead to majority effect in its weak version� For this reason, the Senate began 
to play a role of bastion of the parliamentary opposition to the government and 
to the president (Reydellet, 2001)� Although the organ was critical of the ruling 
camp under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, only during the exercise of 
power by the left (after 1981) it had a particularly strong reflection in the course 
of legislative proceedings� Firstly, the procedure of the last word (dernier mot) of 
the first chamber (article 45 paragraph 4 of the constitution) – a mechanism that 
allows situational reliance on asymmetry of chambers in order to discriminate 
the Senate – was then used by the government on an unprecedented scale� It 
was the only way to neutralise the opposition of senators� For example, in 1985, 
the right to take a final decision by the National Assembly was used 45 times� 
The so-called mixed parity commissions (commission mixte paritaire), which 
serve to maintain the symmetry of legislative process and to avoid the procedure 
of the last word, were then convened 60 times, but they developed a common 
position, which was later supported by both chambers, only in 15 cases� A similar 
situation occurred in earlier years of the left-wing domination on the French 
political scene� Overall, in the period 1981 – 1985 these commissions were set 
up more than 200 times, however their effectiveness was exceptionally low� In 
almost three-quarters of the cases it was necessary to use the procedure of the 
last word given to the National Assembly (Maus, 1998)�
3  Such a strategy proved that the left, which came to power in 1981, intended to uphold the 
presidential paradigm previously introduced by the Gaullists� Until the first cohabitation of 1986, the 
socialist head of state appeared to be a powerful political actor to whom the then prime ministers 
were subordinated (Elgie, 1999)� It should be emphasized that, generally speaking, outside periods 
of cohabitation the head of state is evidently stronger and the prime minister becomes only “the 
president’s manager” (Bell, 2000)�
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Data from this period should be compared with the scale of the govern-
ment’s impact on the relations between the chambers in the 1970s, when the 
entire legislature was politically homogeneous and supported the president 
and the cabinet� Significant differences can be seen in connection with the 
use of the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly� In the 1970s, 
the number of mixed parity commissions was also quite high, but in nearly all 
cases the bodies were able to come to an agreement, which was subsequently 
accepted by both parts of the legislature� Thus, in that decade the final decisions 
of the first chamber were taken sporadically� In the years 1975 – 1980 there were 
only 6 cases of application of article 45 paragraph 4 of the constitution� In this 
respect, this period is also remarkable in comparison with the 1960s, when 
there was a bit more such cases, although not more than 10 per year (Maus, 
1998)� However, the situation was then atypical because of the aforementioned 
conflict between the Gaullist camp and the second chamber, which began on 
a large scale in 1962� An essential source of disputes was also a failed attempt 
to limit the position of the Senate in a referendum in 1969� The goal was then, 
among other things, the elimination of the constitutional arrangements based 
on the symmetry of the chambers� After such changes, the Senate would not 
have been able to block effectively some important activities of the executive 
branch�
The strategy consisting in neutralisation of the parliamentary opposition 
dominating in the second chamber was confirmed at the next occurrence of 
majority effect in a weak version – after the start of Mitterrand’s second term in 
1988� As a result of the parliamentary elections, which took place after two years 
of cohabitation (1986 – 1988), the left formed – after the dissolution of parliament 
and early legislative elections – a government that was able to cooperate with the 
newly elected head of state� Also in this case, the Senate retained its centre-right 
profile, becoming the only bastion of the opposition to the governments of the 
left� Again, the effectiveness of mixed parity commissions strongly decreased� 
In about half the cases, attempts to reach an agreement between the National 
Assembly and the Senate failed, which led to final decisions taken by the first 
chamber (Maus, 1998)� It should be noted, however, that the National Assembly 
existing in the years 1988 – 1993 in some respects distinguished from that of the 
years 1981 – 1986� The differences related primarily to the political configura-
tion of the first chamber� The situation of the left was not so favourable� The 
Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, PS) had in fact only a relative majority of seats 
in the National Assembly (275 out of 577 mandates), which, combined with 
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the negatively oriented Senate, complicated its situation (Amson, 2002)4� These 
inconveniencies after the double elections of 1988 were reflected in the intensive 
use of the most important instruments of rationalised parliamentarianism – not 
only the mixed parity commissions and the procedure of the last word, but also 
other constitutional tools� One of them was laid down by article 49 paragraph 3� 
On this basis, it is possible to combine a bill discussed in the legislature with the 
issue of confidence in the government raised in the first chamber� The cabinet 
headed by Michel Rocard, which was established in 1988, especially often made 
use of this opportunity5� All this meant that rationalised parliamentarianism was 
in these conditions particularly aimed at limiting the position of both segments 
of the legislature, because the overriding objective was to ensure the effective 
functioning of the executive�
It is worth noting that the political configuration in which the Senate is the 
only body within the legislative and executive that represents the opposition to 
the ruling camp has also occurred in recent years� It took place in 2011, when 
left-wing parties won a slight advantage in the second chamber (Gohin, 2013)� 
Although it was not a clear and very disciplined majority, it had an impact on 
the relations between the two parts of the legislature� The best evidence of this 
is the parliamentary session statistics in the years 2011 – 2012� After the period 
of almost complete disappearance, in the years 2002 – 2011, of the procedure of 
the last word of the National Assembly, the tool has become necessary again (Les 
Cinquante-six ans…)� It needs to be emphasized that the then political configura-
tion was quite unusual� The Senate had in fact a rather left-wing profile, whereas 
the other legislative and executive bodies belonged to the centre-right camp� It 
was the first time during the Fifth Republic such a formula of majority effect in 
a weak variant had happened� What is more, even after the presidential and par-
liamentary victory of the left in 2012, the procedure of the last word has not lost, 
4  It is worth highlighting that the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, PCF), 
which entered the cabinets in the years 1981 – 1984, did not form a coalition with the PS after 1988 
(Szarka, 2000)�
5  It allows, under certain conditions, to adopt legislation without voting in the first chamber� 
During the existence of the Rocard government, which functioned for 3 years (1988 – 1991), this 
regulation was used 28 times� (Chevallier, Carcassonne, Duhamel, 2007)� In previous years this 
mechanism had been applied much less often, especially at the beginning of the Fifth Republic (Maus, 
1998)� The particular importance of this regulation can be seen in the context of the status of the 
parliamentary opposition in the French model of rationalised parliamentarianism� As Machelski 
noted, this procedure reverses the majority logic, because it is not the government that is forced to 
seek the majority� Such actions should be taken by opposition groups (Machelski, 2016)�
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contrary to expectations, its importance� This proved that the government could 
not count on permanent and unconditional support of the second chamber�
The variable role of the French Senate is also visible against the background 
of parliamentary responsibility of the government� The authority before which 
the prime minister and other ministers are politically responsible is only the first 
chamber� Even so, the French Senate has been included, to some degree, into 
the structure of the relationship between the parliament and the government 
based on the question of parliamentary responsibility of ministers� The second 
chamber may in fact be used as an additional source of legitimacy of the govern-
ment or the entire dualistic executive� According to article 49 paragraph 4 of the 
constitution, there is no obligation to verify support of senators for government 
policy� It is therefore clear that the practice in this field must depend on existing 
political configurations� The fact that the opposition to the government occupies 
most seats in the second chamber greatly diminishes the likelihood of using 
the said constitutional provision� The risk of rejection of polity proposed by the 
government is then particularly high� In political practice, the procedure has 
not been used very often – for the first time in 1975 by the then prime minister 
Jacques Chirac (Maus, 1998)� If it takes place, it is when the prime minister aims 
to strengthen the position of the cabinet in relation to other organs of the state� 
There is no doubt that the application of this provision can only occur when the 
head of government is confident of a favourable outcome of the vote� For this 
reason, the political specificity of the Senate, which can sometimes operate out-
side the configuration of majority effect, severely limits the applicability of article 
49 paragraph 4 of the constitution� Parliamentary legitimacy of governmental 
policy is in such conditions provided exclusively by a nation-wide representation 
in the National Assembly� As a result, majority effect in its weak form, which 
means that there is no control of the ruling camp over the majority of senators, 
does not give the cabinet full parliamentary legitimacy�
However, the situation was not so schematic in practice� Differences between 
practice between 1981 – 1986 and 1988 – 1993 show this� During the first altern-
ance period and the functioning of the governments created by the left-wing 
parties, the aforementioned configuration prevented the then prime ministers 
(Pierre Mauroy, Laurent Fabius) from verifying support for their policies in the 
second chamber� This was consistent with the logic of rationalised parliamen-
tarianism� Hence, only those mechanisms that served to neutralise the Senate 
were used with considerable intensity� Their aim was to weaken opponents 
of the government that dominated the body� As indicated above, opposition 
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parties of that time were undertaking in the Senate permanent actions aimed 
at amending the legislation proposed by the government (Smith, 2009)� The 
political position of the cabinet was thus built on two pillars� These were the 
president who expected from his governments the implementation of the policies 
defined by the head of state, as well as the National Assembly chosen after the 
elections of 1981� In turn, despite the similar structure of the political scene, the 
next period in which the president and the government came from the left, and 
centre or centre-right senators dominated in the second chamber (1988 – 1993), 
was a bit different� It is indicated by the strategy adopted by Rocard� He had to 
take into account the fact that the National Assembly was not stable politically 
due to the lack of an absolute majority, which could support the government� 
However, despite different political attitudes of the National Assembly and the 
Senate, in some cases the prime minister sought in the latter body the approval 
of the government policy� Such a situation took place twice� In both cases the 
aim was to obtain support of senators with regard to policy in particular areas� 
Not all elements of the programme of the executive were therefore put to the 
vote� Rocard selected only those issues which did not arouse intense controversy 
between the major parties� The first vote referred to the declaration concerning 
the French foreign policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(1989)� In turn, the declaration presented at the beginning of 1991 was devoted 
to the Middle East� Both were supported by a clear majority of senators� In 
the latter case, 290 members of the second chamber favoured the cabinet and 
only 25 were opposed to the government policy in this field (Maus, 1998)� Such 
a strategy of the prime minister resulted from a special international context at 
the turn of the 1980s and 1990s� In the configuration of majority effect in a weak 
version, this was definitely an exception to the rule� Generally speaking, under 
such conditions heads of government did not stand for the Senate’s support for 
the policy created by the executive�
It is also worth noting that after the political change of the Senate majority 
in 2011, when majority effect was again combined with the second chamber 
that represented the opposition, the article 49 paragraph 4 was not the only 
constitutional provision that allowed the government to apply for senators’ sup-
port� Three years earlier, as a result of the comprehensive constitutional reform of 
2008 (Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008 – 724…), a new regulation contained in article 
50 – 1 had been introduced� It gives the government the opportunity to make 
a declaration on a specific issue (the procedure can be also initiated by a parlia-
mentary group, so it reinforces the status of the opposition)� This is followed by 
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a debate, and – if the cabinet decides to do so – by a vote� The latter is therefore 
not obligatory� Furthermore, such a declaration may be presented in each of 
the chambers� One of the most important advantages of the new constitutional 
provision is that there is no need to vote on parliamentary confidence in the 
government� As a result, the prime minister is able to use the article 50 – 1 only 
in part� Because of the lack of a clear majority in the Senate, the aforementioned 
regulation was applied in 2012 by the then socialist prime minister Jean-Marc 
Ayrault (Gicquel, Gicquel, 2015; Vote sur la politique…, 2012)� The strategy cho-
sen by the head of government showed that even after the partial renewal of the 
Senate in 2011, the centre-right opposition to the left-wing governments still had 
much to say� Anyway, thanks to the article 50 – 1, the prime minister could build 
relations with the second chamber in a more flexible way� As a result, the article 
49 paragraph 4, as a more rigorous constitutional provision, may in practice 
lose its importance� On the other hand, after the amendments made in 2008, the 
Senate can expand its role as a body that is a constant point of reference in the 
activities of the government� All this may be seen as one of the manifestations 
of the revised relationship between the executive and the legislative, which was 
the main objective of the reform adopted in 20086�
THE OPPOSITION-DOMINATED SENATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS  
OF COHABITATION
Compared with majority effect in a weak version, a specific situation occurs 
under cohabitation� The coexistence of the president and the government from 
different political camps can – as indicated above – take two forms: with politi-
cally homogenous parliament (the same political camp dominates in each of the 
chambers) and with politically divided parliament (various majorities in the 
chambers)� The first variant of cohabitation took place during the functioning 
of the centre-right cabinets created by Jacques Chirac (1986 – 1988) and Édouard 
Balladur (1993 – 1995)� The politically homogeneous parliament supported the 
6  Proponents of the introduction of new constitutional provisions stressed the need to weaken 
the existing mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism that were designed and adopted in the 
1950s� It is also worth highlighting that in the aftermath of this reform, the constitution regulates the 
status of the parliamentary opposition, although the act mainly refers to the rules of procedure of 
the chambers (art� 51 – 1)� From the point of view of the current tendency which involves the consti-
tutionalisation of the opposition, such a novelty may be considered a step forward�
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government, which remained in opposition to the president� The legitimacy 
provided by senators, though it was not crucial, strengthened, at least to some 
extent, the position of the prime minister and ministers� The second form 
of cohabitation has occurred only once so far� It took place during the years 
1997 – 2002, when the socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin led the government� 
In the latter case, the hostile attitude of the majority of senators was particularly 
important because – in contradiction to the configuration of majority effect 
in a weak form – the government functioned in the conditions of rivalry with 
the centre-right president Jacques Chirac� The second chamber was therefore 
regarded as a valuable ally of the head of state who cannot, under cohabita-
tion, determine the state policy, but is limited to using the so-called power of 
disturbance (faculté d’empêcher), as opposed to the power of decision (faculté 
de statuer; Branchet, 2008)7� The power of disturbance may be imposed on the 
legislative branch (for example, its dissolution), but also on the government (for 
example, the refusal to sign a governmental ordinance issued on the basis of 
article 38 of the constitution8)� As a result, in some cases the president is able to 
disrupt heavily the functioning of the cabinet� In such a situation, the negative 
attitude of the Senate is of particular importance for the government, which is 
forced to deal at the same time with two obstacles – the head of state and the 
second chamber�
The formula of cohabitation in the conditions of a politically divided par-
liament means therefore a system in which the role of the anti-government 
opposition seems to be particularly strong� It covers not only the presidency 
but also the second chamber� Compared with other variants, this is – taking into 
consideration the strength of opposition parties – the optimal one� The second 
chamber acts then as an organ that supports the head of state as the main rival 
7  This configuration leads to the limitation of the role of the president, whose status begins to 
resemble the position of the head of state in the classical parliamentary model (the president as 
a political arbitrator, not a leader who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the state)� As Stevens 
noted, the politically heterogeneous executive power means “a less interventionist and more aloof 
presidency” resulting from a much more parliamentary interpretation of the basic law (Stevens, 2003)� 
However, such a reading does not lead to the re-emergence of a powerful parliament known from 
the period before 1958 (Knapp, Wright, 2001)�
8  Thanks to the article 38, the government can enter the legislative sphere, which is normally 
reserved for the parliament� However, the consent of the latter body is always required� Ordinances 
are then signed by the head of state� This situation in which the president refused to sign such a legal 
act occurred three times in 1986 – at the beginning of the first period of cohabitation (Gouaud, 1996)� 
It has never repeated since then�
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of the government� Hence, from the perspective of the government that has to 
function next to the president from the opposite political camp, it is particularly 
important to neutralise – like during majority effect in a weak form – the second 
chamber� As the third period of cohabitation showed, it became again much 
more common to use the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly� 
This was necessary in case of about one third of the legislation then adopted� It 
should be pointed out, however, that, despite the circumstances of cohabitation, 
this percentage was lower than during the 1981 – 1986 period� This means that 
the navette procedure (aiming at reaching an agreement between the chambers) 
was at the turn of the 1990s and the new century a little more effective� On the 
other hand, the government did not seek support for its policy in the second 
chamber� Due to the dominance of the opposition to the left-wing government, 
the application of article 49 paragraph 4 was not an option� Under difficult condi-
tions of political coexistence within the executive branch, such an action would 
not be rational, because it could indirectly lead to a significant weakening of the 
prime minister in relation to the head of state� It is also worth mentioning that, 
paradoxically, during the third cohabitation the position of the Senate chairman 
was taken over by Christian Poncelet, the fourth president of the Senate under 
the constitution of 1958 and the first member of the Gaullist camp to occupy this 
position (Chevallier, Carcassonne, Duhamel, 2007)� All this increased criticism 
of the left camp towards the second chamber� For the politicians of the ruling 
coalition of the plural left (gauche plurielle) the aforementioned attitude to the 
body had a particular justification in the political situation of that time�
FINAL REMARKS
Nearly sixty years of the constitution of the Fifth Republic has proved that the 
French semi-presidentialism can successfully run a couple of different political 
configurations� Bearing in mind that this period was dominated by the formula 
of identity of the presidential majority and the parliamentary one, and cohabita-
tion of the president and the prime minister from different political camps was 
an exception rather than a principle, it should be noted that it is the Senate which 
could weaken the optimal – at least from the point of view of the politically 
homogenous executive branch – formula of majority effect� The opposition to 
the president and the government gained in such circumstances one of the four 
centres of power within the dual executive and the bicameral legislative, although 
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it needs to be emphasized that the second chamber is undoubtedly the least 
significant of them� This is due to two related factors� Firstly, the most important 
mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism serve to eliminate institutional 
blockades that would make it possible to effectively impede the implementa-
tion of a political programme supported either by the entire executive branch 
(majority effect) or only by its governmental segment (cohabitation)� Secondly, 
the Senate has no possibility to overthrow governments that do not bear political 
responsibility before this body� In this respect, the second chamber differs from 
the other components of the basic constitutional structure� Under the condi-
tions of majority effect, the cabinet is responsible both to the president and to 
the National Assembly, and in the process of cohabitation only before the first 
chamber� The Senate is completely devoid of this right� Such a provision is also 
directly linked to the question of rationalisation� This means minimisation of the 
threat that the government may face from parliament as such (Szymanek, 2005)9�
Therefore, in political practice the specific autonomy of the French second 
chamber, understood as resistance to political trends reflected in the elections to 
the National Assembly, clearly loses a lot of its importance� A different selection 
mode, the lack of correlation between the mandates of deputies (five years) and 
senators (six years; before the reform of 2003 – nine years), as well as partial 
replacements of members of the Senate, means that majorities in the chambers 
do not have to be the same� What is more, political divisions in the Senate may 
not correspond to those in the National Assembly� This is manifested, for exam-
ple, by the composition of the body in the 1960s and the small size of the Gaullist 
group� In turn, in the National Assembly the party enjoyed a clear advantage 
over other fractions� It leads to the conclusion that the then Senate was not 
incorporated into the structure of majority effect� Such an integration process 
took several decades, bringing visible results only in the 21st century� Currently, 
the political structure of the Senate is based on the domination of two parties: 
the Republicans (until 2015: the Union for a Popular Movement – Union pour 
un mouvement populaire, UMP), and the PS� The political role of other groups 
has been clearly reduced� Thus, the tendencies in the party system perceived 
through the prism of the composition of the first chamber, have become clearly 
noticeable in the second chamber (Jakubiak, 2016)�
9  This danger is the most serious in the systems where both chambers can adopt a motion of no 
confidence independently of one another� The government is then at double risk� This worsens, at 
least in theory, its actual position, negatively affecting the level of political stability of the body�
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What is more, attention should be paid to the fact that during the first five 
decades the French Senate was rather centrist (at the beginning of the Fifth 
Republic), and then consistently centre-right� As mentioned earlier, only in 2011 
left-wing parties gained some advantage in the Senate, which lasted exclusively 
until 2014� Such a political configuration of the French second chamber did not 
coincide, in many cases, with the political composition of the National Assembly� 
The latter was much less stable, as confirmed by the phenomenon of alternation 
of power carried out periodically from 1981 to 2002� The Senate remained then 
immunized with the frequent political changes in the first chamber� The centre-
right maintained a solid majority, although senators continued to be traditionally 
more independent of the deputies in the National Assembly� This is what led to 
a situation in which the second chamber could become – during periods of left-
wing governments – a stronghold of the parliamentary opposition� Alternation 
of power in the National Assembly did not mean automatic alternation in the 
Senate� In this respect, there was no connection between the two institutions10� 
The political composition of the second chamber was related more to the results 
of local elections than to the parliamentary ones� In such conditions the Sen-
ate could play the role of chamber of resistance to the political camp which 
dominated other state bodies (the presidency, the government, and the first 
chamber)� As mentioned above, such political “separateness” of the Senate as 
an organ which may, though not necessarily, be included in the political structure 
of majority effect, does not, however, have a fundamental significance� The cause 
lies in the government’s irresponsibility before the second chamber, which does 
not encourage the government to seek support of senators (Boyer, 2011)�
It is also worth noting that despite the said autonomy of the Senate, the sec-
ond chamber has not become an object of a specific institutional engineering� 
The latter may be regarded as the introduction of legal changes, which aim to 
ensure the expected results as to how the political system works (in the political 
practice of the Fifth Republic one of such purposes was to minimise the risk of 
further periods of cohabitation)� As far as the Senate is concerned, such engi-
10  From this point of view, some attention should be devoted to the relationship between the 
National Assembly and the Senate after the beginning of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency in 2017, as 
the far-reaching decomposition, in the legislative elections held in the same year, of the political 
structure of the first chamber has taken place (the marginalization of political formations which 
dominated the political scene in previous years and the emergence of a strong parliamentary repre-
sentation of the political movement supporting the new president)� However, analysis of this problem 
requires a longer time perspective�
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neering would involve permanent inclusion of the second chamber into the 
construction of the majority effect (for example, by unifying the length of term 
of office of both chambers and the mode of selection of their members)� At the 
same time, this would probably mean giving up the formula of incongruence 
of both chambers, which aim is to provide a diverse political representation in 
the French parliament as such� In conjunction with the aforementioned depar-
ture from the formula of cohabitation, the main result of such actions would 
be the consolidation of majority effect in a strong form, in which the majority 
of senators coincides with the majority of deputies in the National Assembly, 
and the dualistic executive is supported by the entire bicameral parliament� As 
a result, the likelihood of majority effect in a weak version would be significantly 
restricted� However, steps aiming at limiting the incongruence of the chambers 
have never been taken� The shortening of the term office of senators to six years, 
which was carried out in 2003, cannot be treated in this way� However, this kind 
of changes would have forced, if introduced, to answer the question of the sense 
of further maintaining such a transformed second chamber in the institutional 
structure� The possible amendments could also go in the opposite direction, 
which would lead to the weakening of the logic of majority effect (Boyer, 2011)� 
This way of thinking is illustrated by unsuccessful reform of the second chamber, 
which was initiated by de Gaulle in the second half of the 1960s� His purpose was 
to remarkably reduce the role of the Senate, above all in legislative proceedings 
(Chapsal, 1984)� In case of success, this reform would have led to a fundamental 
change in the structure of the French rationalised parliamentarianism� It seems 
that if the reform had not failed, the second chamber could no longer have 
been neutralised by the executive only if necessary (through the procedure of 
the last word of the National Assembly), but it would have been permanently 
marginalised as a result of one constitutional reform�
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